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A. REPLY BRIEF OBJECTIVE 
This Reply Brief is intended to controvert and correct 
assertions and interpretations as to (1) the legislative intent of 
Amendments made by the Utah Legislative to the Permanent Total 
Disability provisions of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act, and 
(2)) the legal effect of those Amendments. 
B. ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENT'S INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS 
ERRONEOUS AND WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED EXCEPT BY HIS OWN 
CHARACTERIZATION OF THAT INTENT. 
Since Respondents Brief is devoted entirely to the 
Amendments to the Permanent Total Disability Statute (now designated 
Section 35-1-67 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as Amended) and to what 
Respondent calls the "clear intent" of the Legislature in enacting 
those Amendments, this reply Brief will concentrate primarily upon 
those Amendments as they were made to that Section, keeping in mind 
that there is not a scintillci of evidence to support Respondent's 
assertions as to the Intent of the Legislature in enacting each of 
the Amendments referred to. 
In the first place. Respondent's basic premise in his 
Statement of Issue (p. 1 - Resp. Brief) that the "Utah Legislature 
intended through a series of Amendments in the 1970 8s to place all 
permanently and totally disabled injured workers on an equal 
financial footing regardless of the law in effect at the time of 
iniury" is not true now. nor has it ever been true under the Utah 
Workers1 Compensation Act. It is established Utah Workers1 
Compensation Law that benefits are to be determined by the law in 
effect on the date of injury. Indeed, this very issue was raised^ 
before the Utah Supreme Court in 1976 in Smith v. Industrial 
Commission. 549 P.2d 448. 449 (Utah. 1976) (See Plaintiff's Brief. 
Exhibit "M"). involving one of the Statutory Amendments which is 
part of this controversy, i.e. the Amendment of March 5. 1973. 
(Plaintiff ?s Brief. Exhibit "E"). The applicant claimed there, as 
here, increased benefits provided by the very same 1973 Statutory 
Amendment even though the date of injury was 1968. On Appeal, the 
Supreme Court held (519 P.2d at 449) that: "The benefits were 
definable as to maximum time of payment and amount by the wording of 
the Section on date of injury. « . " and further: "any additional 
benefits would not be awardable by Amendment thereafter. and 
subsection 4. paragraphs 5 and 6 so Amended in 1973 that did enlarge 
2 
such benefits would have no application here". 
That Decision was issued in April, 1976. Query. how 
possibly could the very next Utah legislature in 1977 really intend 
that the increase in minimum Permanent Total Disability benefits 
should or could operate as here contended by Respondent - contrary 
to the specific finding of the Supreme Court in Smith - to place all 
permanently and totally disabled injured workers on an equal 
financial footing regardless of the law in effect on the date of 
injury? The answer is inescapable: The legislature not only could 
not enact such a provision legally in the face of the 1976 Supreme 
Court Decision in Smith, it did not intend any such effect in 1977 
when it simply combined two paragraphs dealing with minimum benefit 
amounts to existing recipients of lifetime benefits and then 
increased that minimum by $15.00 per week over the minimum 
previously available under the 1975 Amendment, 
Plaintiff submits that the Statutory interpretation urged 
by Respondent to create an entirely new lifetime liability from 
Plaintiff (actually the Employers and Carriers of this State) for 
the benefit of Respondent who was specifically denied any lifetime 
benefits by the Statute in effect in the date of his injury, simply 
does not withstand analysis as to the real intent of the legislature 
in enacting those Amendments and certainly flies in the face of the 
Supreme Court pronouncement on that very subject less than a year 
before the 1977 Amendment relied upon by Respondent. The rule of 
statutory interpretation "in favor of coverage" does not and 
properly should not be stretched or tortured to provide the result 
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urged by Respondent. 
II, PLAINTIFFS INTERPRETATION AND ITS APPLICATION OF THE 
AMENDATORY PROVISIONS REPRESENTS THE REASONABLE 
INDEED THE ONLY - LEGISLATIVE INTENT WITH RESPECT TO 
SETTING MINIMUM BENEFITS FOR PERMANENTLY AND TOTALLY 
DISABLED WORKERS WHO WERE ENTITLED TO LIFETIME 
BENEFITS UNDER THE LAWS IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THEIR 
INJURIES. 
The following summary is offered in support of Plaintiff8s 
position: 
1. Permanent Total Disability Statute (Section 42-1-63, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1943, as Amended, 1945) in effect 
on the date of Respondent's injury, July 28, 1948. 
This Statute is found in Plaintiff's Brief, Exhibit "A11. 
It specifically sets forth the weekly amounts for the first 
5 years, a lesser weekly amount thereafter, with the 
following specific proviso added: 
provided, however, that in no case of permanent total 
disability shall more than $8,500.00 be required to be 
paid. 
That dollar limitation needs no clarification and was 
inserted for the first time in the July 1, 1945 Amendments 
to the Statute and specifically replaces the lifetime 
benefits required to be paid by the Employer prior to this 
Amendment. See Compiler's Notes, Section 35, Section 
35-1-67 Utah Code Annotated, Replacement Volume 4B, pp. 
179. (Plaintiff's Brief, Exhibit "P") 
The Order of the Commission (Exhibit "H", Plaintiff's 
Brief) issued on August 27, 1948 was based upon this 
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Statute and was paid in full by the Employer. 
Permanent Total Disability Statute in effect prior to the 
July 1. 1945 Amendment. This Statute is set forth in 
Plaintiff's Brief. Exhibit "B" and expressly provides for 
weekly benefits ''until the death of such person so totally 
disabled . . . " 
It is clear from the above that prior to the July 1, 1945 
Amendment (Exhibit "A" in Plaintiff's Brief) permanently 
and totally disabled workers were entitled to lifetime 
benefits with no limitation as to time or amount. It is 
equally clear that the July 1, 1945 Amendment deliberately 
removed the lifetime benefit provision and inserted in its 
place the maximum benefit amount of $8,500.00 for all such 
injured persons. 
Statutory Amendment of March 5, 1949 - Plaintiff's Brief, 
Exhibit "C". 
This Amendment was a complete revision of Permanent Total 
Disability Section 42-1-63, Rev. Stat. 1943, as Amended. 
It established a rehabilitation referral procedure to 
establish permanent total disability: then provided for the 
first time liability of the Special Fund (now ERF) for life 
after payment by the Employer/Carrier of a maximum of 
$11,000. 
At the time of this Amendment. Respondent was still being 
paid for his 1948 permanent total disability injury under 
the 1948 Commission Order (Plaintiff's Brief, Exhibit "H") 
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and very well could have filed for increased benefits - as 
he did 40 years later in this case - under the 1949 
Amendment which once again provided for lifetime benefits. 
He did not do so either then or following any of the 
subsequent Amendments, all of which applied to workers 
permanently and totally disabled, and all of which provided 
for lifetime payments ia differing amounts, depending upon 
the Statute in effect on the workers date of permanent 
total disability injury. Plaintiff submits that the 
rationale of the Supreme Court decision in Smith v. 
Industrial Commission, supra, approving and applying the 
1946 Supreme Court Decision in Utah Road Commission v. 
Industrial Commission, 109 U. 553., 168 P.2d 319 (1946) 
would have prevented any recovery by Respondent, just as im-
properly should prevent Respondent's recovery in this case. 
4. Statutory Amendment of July 1, 1971 (Plaintiff's brief. 
Exhibit "D") is the next Amendment of significance in this 
controversy, although Amendments in each of the odd years 
between 1949 and 1969 provided for increased weekly 
benefits (PTD) and maximum payments for workers injured 
during the particular year covered by each Amendment. The 
1971 Amendment, however, added a paragraph providing for 
the minimum weekly payment by the Special Fund of $44.00 
for all workers then receiving lifetime benefits from the 
Fund as well as those who qualify thereafter under the PTD 
Section 37-1-67 the new PTD Section under the 1953 Utah 
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Code Annotated Workers' Compensation provisions. 
This new minimum provision was inserted to provide a "cost 
of living" eguivalent for Special Fund lifetime recipients, 
some of whom at that time were receiving only the 1949 
weekly minimum of $25.00 for those injured under that 
Statute. 
In evaluating this Amendment of 1971, it should be pointed 
out that it applied only to lifetime recipients qualifying 
for Special Fund participation restricted to those injured 
on or after July 1, 1971 and not to lifetime recipients who 
were receiving lifetime benefits of much lesser amounts 
from their Employers/Carriers under Statutes in effect 
prior to the July 1, 1945 Amendment (Plaintiff's Brief, 
Exhibit "A"). Such benefits were, for example, the-
lifetime benefits set forth in the 1939 Statute (Exhibit 
"B" of Plaintiff's Brief" which was a maximum of $20.00 per 
week. This oversight was remedied, by subsequent 
legislative Amendment. 
5. July 1, 1973 Amendment. This Amendment (Plaintiff's Brief, 
Exhibit "E") increased PTD benefits to 66 2/3% (from 60%) 
of average weekly wages at date of injury, set 312 weeks 
(up from 5 years) as Employer/Carrier maximum liability, 
and increased Special Fund maximum and minimum amounts for 
those with dates of injury on or after July 1, 1973. The 
Amendment also raised weekly benefits from $44.00 to $50.00 
for those on lifetime benefits from the Special Fund on 
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July 1. 1971 or prior thereto. Note again that the new 
minimum is restricted to those already receiving lifetime 
benefits from this Fund. 
6. April 4, 1974 Amendment. (Exhibit "F". Plaintiff's Brief) 
This Amendment retained the same benefits as provided by 
the July 1, 1973 Amendment, including the weekly minimum 
($50.00) for all persons permanently and totally disabled 
on or before July 1, 1971 and receiving lifetime benefits 
from the Special Fund. 
In addition, a new paragraph was added including for the 
first time permanently and totally disabled persons (1) who 
were injured prior to March 5, 1949 (the date of Statutory 
Amendment) (Plaintiff's Brief, Exhibit "C") providing 
lifetime benefits from the Special Fund for all persons-
injured after that date and (2) who were, as of July 1, 
1974, continuing to receive lifetime benefits from their 
Employer or Carrier (obvious because the Special Fund had 
no liability for PTD benefits until the March 5, 1949 
Statutory Amendment* 
The new language of this 1974 Amendment required the 
Special Fund to pay the difference between the existing 
lifetime weekly benefits being paid by the Employer/Carrier 
and the $50*00 weekly minimum applicable also to those 
receiving full lifetime benefits from the Special Fund-
This Amendment put all permanently and totally injured 
persons currently receiving lifetime benefits at the same 
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minimum level of $50.00 per week. Thus. the 
Employer/Carrier was still responsible for the same 
lifetime benefits as before, while the Special Fund picked 
up the difference between that amount and $50.00 per week. 
7. Amendment of 1975. This Amendment increased maximum PTD 
benefits for persons injured on or after effective date of 
the Statute to 85% (from 66 2/3%) of state average weekly 
wage. Needless to say that provision cannot be applied 
retroactively "to place all permanently and totally 
disabled injured workers on an equal financial footing 
regardless of the law in effect at the time of injury" as 
contended by Respondent in his Brief, (p. 1). 
The 1975 Amendment also had separate paragraphs for: (1) 
permanently and totally disabled presons receiving lifetime 
benefits from the Special Fund on or before July 1. 1971; 
and (2) those injured on or before March 5, 1949 who were 
receiving lifetime benefits from their Employer or Carrier, 
with the Special Fund directed to pay "at a rate sufficient 
to bring their weekly benefit to $60.00 when combined with 
Employer or Insurance Carrier compensation payments". 
The second paragraph included only those who became 
entitled to Special Fund benefits by the 1974 Amendment 
described above and thus provided the same minimum weekly 
benefit for all lifetime recipients of PTD benefits, with 
the Special Fund being solely responsible for all persons 
so injured on or after March 5. 1949. and liable for the 
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difference between $60.00 per week and the weekly amount 
being received at the date of the Amendment by those 
persons from their Employer or Carrier. 
8. Amendment of May 10, 1977, (Plaintiff's Brief, Exhibit "G"). 
The Legislative history provided above for the Utah 
Workers* Compensation permanent total disability Statutory 
Section was presented to show (1) that the legislature was 
indeed careful to make its compensation benefit provisions, 
including maximum and minimum amounts effective only from 
and after the date of enactment of each Amendment and (2) 
that no legislation was ever enacted which granted lifetime 
benefits to any person who had not been awarded lifetime 
benefits by the Permanent Total Disability Statute in 
effect on the date of that persons injury. Such a result 
is consistent with and required by established Utah 
Workers' Compensation law as held in the 1946 Supreme Court 
Decision in Utah State Road Commission v. Industrial 
Commission, supra, and followed in Smith v. Industrial 
Commission, supra in 1976, a case involving one of the same 
Statutes involved in this controversy; i«e. the July 1, 
1973 Amendment, which Amendment, had it been found by the 
Court to be retroactive in application, would have required 
this Special Fund to pay increased lifetime benefits to the 
Plaintiff in that case. 
Likewise, the Amendment of May 10, 1977 did not create a 
new lifetime compensation right in Respondent or anyone 
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else, nor was it intended to create such a result. It was 
intended to do just what the Title (see Plaintiff's Brief. 
Exhibit "G") indicates, i.e. "Requiring minimum benefits 
for all Special Fund participants11 (emphasis supplied). 
Respondent was not at that time, nor was he ever a "Special 
Fund participant", his injury having been incurred prior to 
any Special Fund liability for permanent total disability. 
Further, all benefits to which Respondent was entitled 
under the Statute applicable to his injury were paid in 
full by his Employer and his compensation case closed out 
completely until this attempt to reopen filed almost 40 
years later. 
On the other hand, a look at the 1977 Amendment, together 
with the deleted paragraphs immediately above (Plaintiff's 
Brief. Exhibit "G") indicates clearly nothing more than an 
attempt to combine the two deleted paragraphs and raise by 
$15.00 the minimum weekly benefits from $60.00 to $75. 
The language " . . when paid only by the Special Fund." 
obviously refers to persons permanently and totally 
disabled from and after the March 5, 1949 Amendment 
(Exhibit "£". Plaintiff's Brief) whose full lifetime 
entitlement was the liability of the Special Fund under the 
1949 Amendment and all Amendments to that Section 
thereafter. 
By the same token, " . . including those injured prior to 
March 6. 1949." refers to those - and only those - included 
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in the second deleted paragraph from the 1975 Amendment, 
i.e. . . "all persons who were permanently and totally 
disabled on or before March 5, 1949 and were receiving 
compensation and continue to receive such benefits". The 
remaining language also combines payment provision of the 
two deleted paragraphs, referring to minimum of $75.00 per 
week "when paid only by the Special Fund", referring to the 
first deleted paragraph, and "or when combined with 
compensation payments of the Employer or the Insurance 
Carrier." as specified in deleted paragraph 2 of the 1975 
Amendment, immediately above the new combined language. 
There is no language indicating any intent to create an 
entirely new class of lifetime participants including 
persons permanently and totally disabled under Statutes not. 
providing lifetime benefits of any kind. Indeed the 
combining of the two paragraphs from the 1975 Statute 
suggests nothing more than the adroit revision techniques 
of the Legislative Analyst prior to final presentation to 
the legislature. 
IN SUMMARY: 
It is Plaintiff's sincere belief and its steadfast position 
n this controversy that Respondent's contention that the Amendments 
o the Permanent Total Disability Statute (Section 35-1-67) during 
he years 1971, 1973, 1974, 1975 and particularly 1977, operate to 
vidence a clear-cut legislative intent "to place all permanently 
nd totally disabled workers on an equal financial footing 
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regardless of the law in effect at the date of injury" is completely 
erroneous and wholly unsupported by either the language or any 
intent - express or implied - evidenced in those Amendments. It is 
also the affirmative position of Plaintiff that all of the Statutory 
Amendments referred to by Respondent leave intact the basic Workers 
Compensation premise in Utah that the benefit amounts and duration 
are determined by the Statute in effect upon the date of injury, and 
further that the establishment by the legislature in 1974. Amended 
in 1975 and 1977. of a minimum weekly compensation for all persons 
at that time receiving lifetime benefits either from the Special 
Fund (now Employers1 Reinsurance Fund) or from their Employer or 
Insurance Carrier, did not operate as contended by Respondent, to 
create a new and additional, never contemplated lifetime right to 
compensation benefits to Respondent whose parameters of compensation 
were set by the Statute in effect at the time of his 1948 industrial 
injury and did not include any lifetime benefits after payment by 
his Employer of the Statutory maximum in effect at the time of his 
injury. 
The bottom line is that neither the 1977 Statutory 
Amendment nor any of the other Amendments referred to by Respondent 
is susceptible to the legitimate conclusion that the Utah 
Legislature intended - or did in fact - grant to this Respondent a 
right to lifetime permanent total disability entitlement which had 
been denied to him by the Statute in effect on the date of his 1948 
injury. 
Accordingly. Respondent's position in this controversy 
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properly should be rejected and Plaintiff's position - as a matter 
of law - should be adopted and upheld. 
Ill, RESPONDENT•S STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE 
LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS OF 1971 THROUGH 1977, EVEN IF 
ACCEPTED. FLIES IN THE FACE OF ESTABLISHED UTAH 
WORKERS" COMPENSATION LAW AS EVIDENCED BY DECISIONS OF 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND. THEREFORE. IS INVALID AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
As explained above. Plaintiff believes strongly that the 
Utah Legislature in enacting the 1977 Amendment to the Permanent 
Total Disability Section 35-1-67, intended only to combine the two 
paragraphs of the 1975 Amendment treating the same subject and to 
provide for a $15.00 per week increase for all recipients of 
lifetime benefits, not to create an entirely new class of employees 
eligible for lifetime benefits and to make the Special Fund 100% 
liable for providing those additional benefits. Had the legislature 
intended the result urged by E.espondent it could have done so by a 
simple Amendment saying: 
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled 
are entitled to benefits from the Special Fund 
designated in subjection (1) of Section 35-1-68 and 
shall receive not less than $75.00 per week when paid 
only by the Special Fund or when combined with 
compensation payments of the Employer or Insurance 
Carrier. 
As indicated above in this Reply Brief and throughout 
Plaintiff's Brief on this case, Plaintiff also contends that in any 
event, the result urged by Respondent's interpretation of the 1977 
Amendment of Section 35-1-67 flies in the face of established Utah 
Workers1 Compensation Law evidenced less than 1 year prior to the 
1977 Amendment by the Supreme Court Decision in Smith v. Industrial 
Commission, supra and thus is invalid as a matter of law if applied 
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to Respondent's July. 1948 injury. See also Utah State Road 
Commission v. Industrial Commission, supra holding that the law in 
effect when the injury was sustained governs the amount of award for 
a permanent total disability. 
Finally, see this Court of Appeals 1989 Decision in Wicat 
Systems v. Pellegrini, 721 P.2d, 686, 687 (1989) where this Court 
held that the allocation of liability Amendment in 1984 increased 
the percentage liability of Plaintiff and thus enlarged its 
obligations. 
This Court: 
These kinds of Amendments fit within the category not 
to be retroactive. 
The Court held further that the Amendment was not in 
clarification of existing law and applied properly the law in effect 
at the time of the injury. 
In summary, the law on the date of Respondent's injury in 
this case was clear and Amendments to the Statute thereafter which 
enlarged the rights of Respondent and which created a substantial 
liability in the Special Fund which did not exist under the Statute 
in effect at the date of injury cannot be applied retroactively as 
contended by Respondent. Established Utah Workers* Compensation Law 
as demonstrated by the cases cited above and many others make it 
clear that as a matter of law. Respondent has no permanent total 
disability rights beyond those awarded to him - and paid - under 
Section 42-1-63 as it existed on the date of his July 28, 1948 
injury. As a corollary, the Special Fund had no liability to 
Applicant under that Statute and the later Statute Amendments cannot 
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be applied retroactively to create a substantial liability for this 
defendant where ri£ liability existed under the law in effect on the 
date of injury. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The Commission's Order in this case should be reversed and 
Respondent's claim dismissed. Respondent's basic premise as to the 
intent of the Utah Legislature in enacting the Amendments to the 
Permanent Total Disability Statute (now Section 35-1-67 U.C.A.) is 
erroneous and does not withstand analysis of the legislative history 
of that Section. On the other hand. Plaintiff's analysis of the 
various Amendments and language used in each shows clearly the 
intent of the Legislature to deal only with the lifetime benefits of 
persons awarded such lifetime benefits under Statutes in effect on 
the date of their injuries, with the intent of the 1974, 1975 and 
1977 Amendments being to assure all persons receiving lifetime 
benefits of a basic minimum ($75.00 by the 1977 Amendment) to be 
paid solely by the Special Fund for those injured after March 5, 
1949 or by the Employer/Carrier jointly with the Special Fund to 
persons who were injured prior to March 6e 1949 and who were awarded 
lifetime benefits against the Employer/Carrier * There is no 
evidence to support Respondent's contention that the 1977 Amendment 
somehow created a new right for lifetime benefits in Respondent or a 
new liability against the Special Fund for 100% of those newly 
created benefits. 
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that any such Amendment, if 
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intended and enacted, would be invalid as against the Special Fund 
as a matter of law under application of established Utah Workers' 
Compensation Law, as evidenced particularly by the Smith Decision, 
supra, handed down less than a year before the 1977 Amendment 
critical to Respondent's recovery in this controversy. 
Respectfully submitted this day of February. 1993. 
Erie Vo Boorman, Administrator 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
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Salt Lake City UT 84114-6615 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of REPLY 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF ERF. in the case Of ROBERT L. SEITZ . were 
mailed, or hand delivered, this day of February. 1993 to 
the following address: 
Virginius Dabney. Esq.. Attorney for Defendant Robert L. 
Seitz. DABNEY & DABNEY. P.C.. 350 South 400 East #202. Salt 
Lake City UT 84111 
Benjamin A. Sims. Esq.. Attorney for Defendant Industrial 
Commission of Utah 
THE EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
By. 
C. Thuy Nguyen. Office Tech. 
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